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x 
I, APPROACH 
This paper takes as its point of departure the rhetoric of 
donor agencies and of national plans which requires a high priority 
for rural development, and especially for rural development that 
!
 will benefit the poorer rural people. It is concerned with project i 
:
' selection/ both in theory and in practice. It takes "project 
. selection" to include identification, design, appraisal and choice. 
' '. It does not tackle issues of radical redistribution, for example 
i. 
• through land reform, vital though that sometimes is as a precondition 
."• for major help to poorer rural people. The focus is more on the 
• » ' ' # . 
- .. options open to donors than to recipient governments, although much 
of the argument applies to both, 
A persistent problem in thinking constructively about project 
•selection for poverty-focused rural development is the temptation 
to start with appraisal methodology. In particular, the corpus of 
' literature on cost-benefit analysis is accessible and intimidating 
V •
 t
 and carries authority by sheer weight and frequency of mutual 
•citation. It is a struggle (partially lost below) to avoid 
criticising CBA when one should be proposing constructive alter-
natives. It is a struggle to see that the right starting point is 
hot the library but the village, not the means but the end, not the 
methodology of appraisal but the poorer rural people. Starting 
from them instead of from the cost-benefit paradigm, and trying to 
see approaches designed primarily to help them rather than to 
consummate the conditioning of economists, leads away from complexity 
and towards the conclusion that simple is practical. 
1. I am grateful to Richard Jolly for comments on an earlier 
' version of this paper. Responsibility for the views expressed is, 
of course, mine alone. 
II RURAL REALITIES: PROBLEMS AMD OPPORTUNITIES 
The poorer rural people are hard to reach and hard to help. 
They are typically unorganised, inarticulate, often sick, 
seasonally hungry, and dependent on local patrons. They are less 
educated, less in contact with communications, less likely to use 
government services, and less likely to visit outside their home 
area than their better-off rural neighbours. They are often 
especially concentrated in areas remote from urban centres. Further, 
they are relatively invisible. Urban-based officials and foreign 
experts alike can easily, as "rural development tourists", make 
rural visits without either seeing or speaking tc the poorer people. 
Residentially, they are often separate. A week could be spent in 
South India visiting villages without ever entering one of the 
harijan colonies where many of the very poorest live. In parts 
of Africa, roadside elites are emerging as the richer people buy 
up the more desirable plots beside the roads and build good houses 
there, while the poorer people increasingly shift away out of 
sight. Visitors tend to Bee, to meet, and to interact with, only 
the more influential and better off rural people. 
As though these were not obstacles enough, there is a notorious 
'tendency - the "talents effect" (Pearse 19 77) - for the rich to get 
richer and the poor to remain as they are or get poorer. Projects 
and programmes for rural development are again and again captured 
by rural elites for their own advantage. Credit goes to the credit-
worthy who are those who least need it. Subsidised inputs supplied 
through a co-operative are monopolised by the leaders of the 
co-operative who are the better-off people to star ; with. There 
seems to be a general law that the more money has to be spent in 
a rural development programme and the shorter the period in which 
that money has to be spent, the more likely it is that the rural 
elite will benefit disproportionately. 
The selection of poverty-focused projects has to take account 
of these realities. Approaches which generate livelihoods, which 
create rural labour demands, which provide services to which all have 
access, or which enable poor people to support one another and to 
or-, nise themselves in groups, will usually be preferred. Some 
laz ,e projects which distribute or redistribute productive assets 
to poor people (including some irrigation and settlement projects) 
may score well. But many of the most effective initiatives will 
look very different from traditional large high-capital projects. 
They may emphasise institutions. They may combine high-risk 
experimental approaches with replicability. They may involve, 
for example, forms of agricultural organisation for small farmers, 
or for landless labourers, or for women; or procedures for 
recruiting smaller farmers for farmer training courses? or the 
development of alternative sources of income for landless agri-
cultural labourers in the off-season; or improvements in the 
management of irrigation bureaucracies; or the provision of mobi.le 
services for nomadic people. In these and other cases, local-
level institutions and procedures are likely to have a central 
importance. 
In future it seems that many of the most effectively poverty-
oriented rural projects will in practice be 
(i) small. Even where a programme, for example for building 
rural health posts, may be quite large, its component 
projects may be small; 
(ii) administration-intensive rather than capital-intensive. The 
amount of administrative input per dollar expended will be 
high; 
(Hi) difficult to monitor and inspect. Many of the most effective 
programmes will be highly dispersed, and will often involve 
actions like the formation of groups or the construction of 
small items of infrastructure which are not easy to inspect; 
(iv) slow to implement. Dispersed construction faces logistic 
problems; scattered staff are difficult to supervise; remote 
areas are difficult to reach; local participation (so v/idely 
advocated but so rarely analysed) implies going at the people
1 
pace; 
(v) not suitable for complex techniques for project appraisal. 
Geographical dispersal, uncertainties about implementation, 
low project costs, and the largo numbers of projects combine 
to make standard complex techniques for project appraisal 
both expensive and inappropriate. 
If this is where many of the needs and opportunities lie, 
much of the aid and investment process appears still to point in 
other directions. A gap yawns between the rhetoric of poverty-
orientation and the reality of project appraisal and implementation. 
To understand this, we must turn to some of the obstacles to an 
effective poverty-orientation on the part of governments and, more 
especially, of donors. 
Ill OBSTACLES TO AM EFFECTIVE POVERTY-ORIENTATION 
The obstacles discussed below are by no means a complete list; 
but they do comprise some of the more serious difficulties which 
relate directly to project selection. 
/I. The Needs of Donors 
In contrast with the rural poor, the rich donors are well-
organised, articulate, educated, concentrated in urban centres, 
and above all powerful. Their needs are many and various. They 
include a need to satisfy themselves that their funds are being 
"well-spent" as well as a need actually to spend them. The poverty-
orientation of many donors in recent years has produced a crisis in 
Which it has become rather difficult to spend some aid budgets on 
desirable projects. There is a common lament that poverty-oriented 
projects are scarce. Donors compete with one another to aid a few 
favourite poverty-oriented countries, and in other countries to 
support the few poverty-oriented projects which can be found. But 
as the need to spend persists and even becomes more acute, donors 
are still impelled to prefer projects which are 
(i) large 
(ii) capital-intensive rather than administration-intensive 
' (iii) easy to monitor and inspect 
Civ) quick to implement (using foreign skills where necessary) 
(v) considered suitable for complex techniques of project appraisal. 
> 
, These preferences are reinforced by some of the writing about 
devjlopment. Economists have tended to pay more attention to 3arge 
than to small projects. Large projects are more familiar to 
economists, from industrial countries; funds, at least in the past, 
may have been more readily available to study them than to study 
small projects; data from them may have been more accessible; and 
they have lent themselves to conventional methods of ex ante 
appraisal and ex post evaluation. Thus 28 out of the 29 projects 
analysed in John A. King's Economic Development Projects and Their 
Appraisal (1967) were for major infrastructure? and although his 
analysis was far from conventional, Hirschman's eleven cases in 
Development Projects Observed (196 7) were all large-scale. Roads, 
power, multi-purpose valley development, industries like cement, 
paper and steel, and large agricultural or irrigation projects, 
have tended to be the most visible, the most prestigious, the most 
visited and the most written about. More recent studies, such as 
Uma Lele's The Design of Rural Development; Lessons from Africa (1975), 
although still examining some large projects, have shifted attention 
towards smaller, more scattered and decentralised initiatives to 
raach and help the rural poor. The question is whether donors and 
recipient governments can and will similarly shift their sights and 
priorities so that deeds follow words. 
2. The Big Project Trap 
The shift is difficult because interlocking forces bias donors 
and recipient governments alike towards large projects. The reasons 
are a commonplace. For some donors, big is beaufiful because big 
is bankable: pressures to spend aid funds are best overcome through 
large infrastructural projects. Such projects tend to have a high 
import content, which pleases industrial donors. They are usually 
highly visible and photogenic which pleases political leaders and 
civil servants alike. They are professionally challenging. They 
provide opportunities for corruption. They provide contacts for 
local professionals and civil servants which may make it easier for 
them to join the brain drain to the richer world. Consultant firms 
throughout the world find large projects a source of profitable 
employment. Implementation can be assured where necessary through 
the use of foreign skills. And such projects lend themselves to 
complex methods of project appraisal which can give an appearance, 
at least, of respectability to the decision to invest. 
Because of the conjuncture of all these forces, big projects 
can be a trap. Moreover, the teeth of the trap may close much 
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earlier than is commonly realised. Irreversibility of commitment, 
whether by recipient or donor, whether by politician or civil 
servant, does not feature much if at all. in the literature of 
project appraisal; but by the time a formal project appraisal is 
complete, the decision to invest may already effectively have 
been taken, rendering appraisal largely irrelevant. 
To the extent that big projects are needed to support or 
complement poverty-oriented programmes, or to the extent that, as 
with some agricultural settlement and irrigation projects, they 
are directly poverty-oriented, there may be situations where the 
big project trap is not too serious. But there is always a danger 
that a big project will divert resources (including administrative 
resources) and attention away from other better projects or activities. 
A- spectacular example is provided by the Tarbela dam in Pakistan, 
•estimated to cost $1,2 billion. It has been calculated that the 
.water it will make available to irrigators will be less than one 
third 0£ what might be saved for a fraction of the cost through 
improved management o£ existing irrigation in Pakistan. Thi.s 
appears to be a case V/here a highly visible and prestigious project 
•has focused attention in the wrong place, away from less spectacular 
but much more rewarding alternatives. More generally, big projects 
i\iay provide diversions which make it easier to avoid grasping the 
.nettle of rural poverty. If the metaphors can be forgiven, in the 
1960s, large projects were sometimes described as white elephants 
Which became sacred cows. VJith the poverty-orientation of the 19 70s, 
they may now often be red herrings. 
Complexity, Dependence and Delay 
A further obstacle to effectively poverty-oriented projects 
is the complexity and obscurity of some of the more elaborate, and 
supposedly sophisticated, methods of appraisal. Whatever has 
happened to the economies of the poorer countries, the literature 
of project appraisal has long since taken off into self-sustaining 
growth. Its density and mass exert a gravitational pull on scholars 
and practitioners alike. Some of them appear to be prisoners of 
the^paradigm of social cost-benefit analysis. Those whose inclinations 
arr more academic can spend a lifetime criticising and elaborating 
the method, a safe occupation since there can be no danger of its 
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imperfections ever being fully reformed? and those whose inclinations 
are more practical can spend a lifetime practising their art, secure 
in the knowledge that their academic colleagues are ensuring an 
increasing demand for their services. As more and more objectives 
and Considerations are added (through employment and income 
distribution to nutrition and women? and what about irreversibility 
of commitment, or administrative capacity as a scarce resource?) the 
process of appraisal becomes more laborious. One may observe with 
awe the inadvertent prudence of international economists: for as 
employment declines in the industrial countries, they ensure a rising 
demand for their services in the third world by inventing and 
insisting on the use of techniques of project appraisal which are 
more and more complex and labour-intensive. 
Any evaluation of a method of a project appraisal should, 
however, be based not on its appearance or on the theory of how 
it should be applied, but on what happens in practice. It is here 
that the analyses of those who approach from the standpoints of 
political science and public administration (such as Caiden and 
Wildavsky, 19 74, and Self, 1975) have much to contribute. In 
practice, and especially with big projects, very powerful political 
and personal forces can be at work. Three examples reported to the 
writer can illustrate what may happen. In the first, a multilateral 
agency was anxious to fund a livestock project in a certain country. 
The appraisal team calculated an internal rate of return of 11 per 
cent. The headquarters of the organisation cabled instructing them 
to make it 15. In the second ease, an appraisal team, after months 
of work on an electricity project, visited the Permanent Secretary 
and informed him that the rate of return would be 9 per cent. They 
were told "come back tomorrow when it is 14". In the third example, 
an economist himself used cost-benefit analysis as a political tool. 
When working for a consultancy firm he decided that a project was 
undesirable, The engineers in the consultancy firm had, however, 
told him that they wanted a high rate of return. His response was 
to devise and use a complex system of probability distributions 
which the engineers could not understand, and which under almost 
all assumptions came out very unfavourably. The engineers, however, 
had the last laugh since they took the highest of all the rates of 
return, and recorded blandly in their report that the project could 
achieve a rate of return "as high as" that figure. It is of course 
a matter of judgement how widespread such practices are. But it is 
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noteworthy that the OXFAM Handbook for its Field lirectors warns 
that "The danger of using shadow prices is that they may be 
over- or under-estimated in order to justify projects to which 
the appraiser feels personally committed". (1976:5) 
What happens in practice may then be ironic. Complex and 
supposedly sophisticated project appraisal techniques have been 
developed with the aim of making decision-making more rational. 
Paradoxically, their effect can be the opposite. As Carruthers 
has written in a critical review of Squire's and van der Tak's 
Economic Analysis of Projects (19 75), "A practice has not much to 
recommend it if the working of the method and the decision criteria 
are not evident to the decisbn makers". Further, precisely because 
the techniques are obscure and rest on judgements which are matters 
of opinion, they are known by decision-makers to be manipulable. 
Far from defending appraisers from political pressures, they expose 
them all the more. The dangers of abuse would be less if appraisal 
methods Were more open to inspection and more intelligible. 
Further, complex procedures contribute to and sustain dependence 
and delay. The combination of pressure to find projects, of shortage 
of good projects, and of the demand of donors for complex appraisals, 
creates a crisis. The response of many international agencies is 
to intervene in project preparation. But as Rondinelli has argued 
in his examination of the World Bank, USAID and UNDP 
"The direct intervention of international agencies in 
project preparation is in part a response to the severe 
deficiencies in planning and project analysis skills 
in developing nations, but the 'deficiencies' are, in 
a sense, artificially created by the complexity of 
international procedures. Project preparation guidelines 
are designed to ensure that proposals are compatible 
with lending institution policies, procedures and 
requirements; and as such have become instruments of 
control rather than of aid. And as those procedures 
become more numerous and complex, further demands are 
placed on the limited planning and administrative 
capacity 6f developing nations, making them more 
dependent, on foreign expertise .., the imposition of 
international requirements ... may in fact, have 
aggravated the problem of preparing relevant and appro-
priate investment proposals." (1976a: 3) 
Those in the would-be recipient countries play the game. They go 
in for "window-dressing". In Ahmad's words 
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"It is the general feeling in most developing countries 
that the more technical and complex the presentation, 
the more the use of shadow prices, tradeoffs, engineering 
coefficients, convincing evaluation of investment 
criteria, the better the chances of finding a bilateral 
or multilateral donor" (1975:85) 
The demands for such data affect poorer countries adversely, since 
those are the countries which find such data most difficult to i 
generate. Donors too respond by concentrating their attention in 
ways which reduce benefits to the poorer countries and to the 
poorer people v/ithin countries. According to Rondinelli again: 
"The limited staff time within aid agency headquarters 
leads to a preference for large projects in developing 
countries with better project preparation capabilities 
or with access to technical consultants, then for smaller 
projects in poorer countries with limited preparation 
capabilities," (1976a:20) 
There is thus a malignant syndrome of quasi-sophistication. 
Donors bring to bear "an imperious rationality" (Rondinelli, 1976b) 
on recipients, even when the complex operations entailed have been 
rejected in donor countries themselves (for an example of rejection 
in Canada see Laframboi&e, 19 71; for a supporting argument from 
Kenya, see Chege 1973), The complex procedures delay projects. 
Delays to projects increase pressures for donor's to spend. Pressures 
to spend exert biases towards the less poor developing countries, 
towards larger projects, towards urban areas (Lipton, 19 77), towards 
the more accessible rural areas, and within rural areas, tov/ards 
those who are better off. In short, complex procedures divert 
development efforts away from the poorer rural people. 
The Pre-emption of Administrative Capacity 
Again and again administrative capacity - the capacity to 
get things done - emerges as a preoccupation. It is, indeed, often 
the most critically scarce resource (Chambers 1969, 19/4:152). 
Problems of implementation, above all in the rural sector, are an 
aknost universal lament. Lele (1975 :176) concludes from her study 
of rural projects in Africa that the most important factor in 
limited effectiveness was the "extreme scarcity of trained local 
manpower". The shortage of good rural projects is often a 
crippling impediment. The capacity to spend is often severely 
limited. In Botswana, in the throe years from 1973/74 to 19 75/76, 
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the Ministry of Agriculture was able to spend only 30 per cent of 
its development budget. The capacity to implement is often a far, 
far scarcer resource limiting achievement than any other factor; 
but the implications of this widely recognised fact have apparently 
not been incorporated in project appraisal. 
Three aspects of the scarcity of administrative capacity 
deserve attention. First, managerial and technical skills attracted 
to a project may have a very high cost indeed in terms of benefits 
foregone elsewhere in th6 economy. The ODA Manual has a significant 
line: "The supreme importance of good management for the success of 
a project must always be kept in mind" (1972:23). The recurrent 
danger is that donors will insist on recruiting high-level nationals 
to manage projects, removing them from key posts of greater importance. 
This cost does not feature in Little and Mirrlees, who list land, 
labour, capital, foreign exchange and savings among their scarce 
resources, but net administrative capacity (1974 , chapter 3). The 
nearest they come to considering it is in the shadow pricing of 
skilled labour (pp. 229-231). They write "If there is a shortage 
of skilled people (and for many categories of skills this is true 
and likely to remain true for some time in the case of many developing 
countries) then ... one cannot do better than ask what employers are 
willing to pay for the relevant skills". The accounting price would 
then be the price which would eliminate any excess demand for such 
skills (ibid. 231). And they conclude that "it does not seem to 
us that very much time should normally be spent on contemplating 
the problems raised in this section". But against this, in a small 
developing country in particular, the removal from his post of one 
key national may have a cost in terms of development foregone which 
will be very high indeed. 
Second, administrative.capacity is not very elastic. A government 
organisation used for one programme may not be capable of simult-
aneously carrying out another. Demands for information may have high 
costs in other staff activities foregone. The introduction of a 
programme for agricultural credit to be implemented by an extension 
service may appear desirable, but may be anti-developmental because 
of the other extension activities which it crushes or pre-empts. In 
Mwanza District in Tanzania, to take a concrete example, the arrival 
of tractors diverted agricultural extension staff from a promising 
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programme for improving cotton production among the generality of 
farmers to a narrow programme of mechanisation. Not only was the 
mechanisation a failure, but much more seriously, the potentially 
very high benefits of the extension programme were lost (Chambers 
1969). 
Third, the time of economists and planners is itself a scarce 
resource. Cost-benefit analysis has costs and benefits itself. 
But remarkably a survey of some of the texts on project appraisal 
(McKean 1958; King 1967; Harberger 1972; ODA 1972; OECD 1973; Little 
and Mirrlees 1974? Squire and van der Tak 19 75? Irvin 19 76; Bergmann 
and Boussard 1976; and Scott, MacArthur and Newbery 19 76) reveals 
that they concentrate almost exclusively on procedures of analysis 
and their presumed benefits while ignoring or not considering in 
i 
any detail th£ costs of carrying them out. Some economists appear 
to have either a mental block or a becoming modesty when it comes 
to costing their scarce selves. But only when they are able to treat 
their own time as a scarce resource will they be able to make good 
decisions about optimal levels of complexity in project selection. 
An honourable and important exception is provided by Carruthers 
and Clayton (forthcoming). Not only do they evaluate project appraisal 
from the point of view of the demands it makes on skilled effort, 
but they also examine the potential benefits from alternative uses 
of that capability. They write 
"... It is not completely cynical to say that elaborate 
and superficially impressive appraisal techniques present 
an aura of spurious accuracy which imbues decision-makers 
with a false sense of confidence when selecting projects. 
Moreover, the laborious process of shadow pricing, according 
to the manuals, absorbs an undue amount of skilled effort 
while ex-post evaluation reveals that the factors which 
determine project success or failure are not primarily 
related to these aspects of planning." (ibid. 9-10) 
They recommend a system of appraisal using a decision matrix 
(Appendix A) and simplified calculations, and suggest that this 
would release capability which could give greater attention to 
neglected technical and economic issues, such as the forecasting 
which is so important in agricultural projects. 
1. Squire and van der Tak do, however, briefly consider the costs 
and benefits of their proposals. They believe that the benefits 
justify the costs, but note nevertheless that "the initial cost of 
transition to the now me.: I;hodo.1 ogy ia substan tia.1, since users must 
become familiar with iho now techniques, and initial estimates of 
country parameters for shadow-pricing must be built up" (1975:10). 
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Even if it is recognised that administrative capacity is 
often the most constraining resource - more constraining than 
finance - it would be both difficult and undesirable to try to 
incorporate it in conventional appraisal methods: it would be hard 
indeed to give it a shadow price. If, however, it is not considered, 
then decisions will be taken on unreal assumptions. A project may 
appear to give a good rate of return when appraised conventionally, 
but a negative rate of return if the costs of the administrative 
capacity it pre-empts are taken into account. If procedures are 
simple then it is easier to weigh factors such as this. One 
possibility is to add administrative capacity to the decision matrix 
proposed by Carruthers and Clayton (Appendix A), while recognising 
that it cannot easily be expressed in numbers and that its assess-
ment must be a matter for judgement and commonsense rather than 
counting. 
SOLUTIONS: SIMPLE IS PRACTICAL 
This examination of the obstacles to a poverty-orientation in 
prbject selection for'rural development suggests that complex is 
often crude? and that true sophistication is to be found in 
.simplicity. For the many rather small projects which are an 
Essential part of any poverty orientation, methods of selection 
are needed which are simple, open to inspection, intelligible, and 
sparing in the scarce skills and time which they demand. 
Three thrusts are s uggested. They have a common direction 
towards simplicity - in decentralised administration, in procedures, 
and in the experience of officials - as a means of improving project 
selection for poverty-focused rural development. 
(1) Decentralisation 
Poverty-focused rural development requires changes of direction 
and emphasis. It is true that major infrastructure in the form of 
roads and other communications, storage facilities, and the like are 
often a necessary precondition for or complement to smaller projects. 
Bu' since large projects are relatively easy, much more attention has 
nov to be given to smaller, lower-level initiatives. The sheer 
volume of identification and appraisal work that these entail could 
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easily drown central government and aid agency officials. There 
is already a sad history of district-level planning in many 
countries and regions (Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia for their Second 
Five Year Plans, and Tamil Nadu in 1973/4) in which many projects 
have been worked out in the districts and submitted in long hetero-
geneous shopping lists to the centre, only to be ignored because of 
(a) the poor quality of the submissions, and more importantly 
(b) the impossibility of handling so much detail. The results have 
been disillusion among field staff, political embarrassment at all 
leVels, and high stacks of mouldering documents gathering dust on 
the shelves of offices, For the future, the only way forward on 
any scale appears to be through effective decentralisation. 
For such decentralisation to work, financial discretion has to 
•be given to staff at the local level. One pattern which deserves 
serious trials where it does not yet occur is a block grant system 
in which each financial year a sum of money is made available to 
local-level officials to spend at their discretion on projects which 
accord with centrally determined guidelines. These guidelines can 
stipulate that the main beneficiaries of projects should be poorer 
rural people. Experience with block grants has already been gained 
.in East Africa (Collins 1974, Chambers 1974: 94-100). There are of 
•'course dangers of misallocations and of corruption. But prudent 
and Cautious accountants and auditors always seem to distrust local-
level officials. The distrust becomes self-validating when those 
officials are given little discretion and thus little opportunity 
to demonstrate their capabilities. In many countries, field staff 
constitute a major, very expensive, and seriously under-utilised 
resource. Only by giving them more discretion and resources can 
they realise their potential. Donors who do not have a local cost 
constraint are particularly well placed for this sort of assistance. 
With decentralisation combined with central guidelines, the 
administration-intensive processes of identification and preparation 
can be undertaken by the often under-utilised local-level staff. 
Central government staff, including planners and economists, can 
have monitoring and training roles which are much less exacting than 
i 
at' mpting identification and appraisal themselves. And many more 
sin ui initiatives can be undertaken to the benefit of the rural poor. 
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(2) Simple procedures 
An essential part of any poverty-focused rural development 
is the devising and use of simple procedures. There appears to 
be an almost universal tendency for procedural overkill. Procedures 
are almost always additive: new ones are introduced, but old ones 
are not abolished. Procedures drawn up by committees, or through 
consultation with various people or departments, tend to be longer 
and more complicated them those drawn up by one person - and any 
tendency for more participative management reinforces this. It is 
often safer to add a requirement for an additional item of information 
than to leave it out. Promotions go to bright people who can answer 
questions, and not to those who say
 M
I did not consider the costs of 
collecting the information justified the benefits of being able to 
answer your question - Sir!" 
A first step is then to have the courage not to know. Put 
differently, it is important to be vulnerable to criticism for 
being simplistic. Optimal simplicity will usually appear naive. 
Simple procedures bring decisions into the open. As we have 
noted, one reason why social cost-benefit analysis is so exposed to 
.abuse is that it is obscure. It is easy, and is known to be easy, 
to adjust discount rates and shadow prices to produce a wide range 
of results. Rationality may be best defended through selection 
procedures which can easily be understood by a non-economist layman. 
Several simple procedures can be suggested: 
(i) Poverty rankings 
The key here is to identify the crucial questions which need 
to be asked, and then to present answers in a form which is clear 
enough to be argued out. One example is the poverty-ranking for 
rural projects which has been suggested for Botswana (see Appendix B), 
This procedure has been designed to force officials to ask and answer 
directly the crucial "who benefits?" question. In the example of a 
veterinary quarantine fence, it immediately shows that this particular 
rural project will most directly benefit relatively rich people who 
li
 1
 in towns and largo villages more ilxin the rural poor. A crude 
anc simple procedure like this which should by no means be time-
consuming, should force officials in an originating ministry (or 
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with decentralisation it could be in a regional or district 
administration) to think about and state who they consider the 
main direct beneficiarie s will be. The approving ministry can 
then argue out the rankings and the originating official or 
i 
ministry must be prepared to defend them. The system should 
affect the thinking, behaviour and choices of those who identify, 
design and select projects, with benefits to the poorer rural 
people. 
(ii) Checklists 
Another approach is to use checklists. Two examples of 
checklists of questions and considerations in project identification 
and appraisal are given in; 
(a) the DK Overseas Development Ministry's A Guide to Project 
Appraisal in Developing Countries (ODA 1972) 
(b) the Government Affairs Institute's Managing Planned Agricultural 
Development (1976: XI-15 - XI-29). 
There are always dangers that checklists v/ill become too long and 
elaborate. But if they are drawn up with care and restraint, they 
can reduce the dangers of omitting important considerations without 
making appraisal unduly laborious. There is scope for more short 
checklists. 
(lil)Listing costs and benefits 
If some sort of cost-benefit appraisal is needed for a small 
project, a simple approach is possible, as recommended by Managing 
Planned Agricultural Development (ibid: XI-29): 
"The technique recommended ... is to identify all relevant 
aspects of proposed projects, quantifying those costs and 
benefits for which data are available, and to which monetary 
values can bo assigned without violating common sense". 
The word "all" is dangerous, since with ingenuity one can add almost 
endlessly to costs and benefits. But-the approach in practice is 
likely to be intelligible and to provide a reasonable basis for 
decision. A .similar method is advocated in the 0XF7\M Field Directors' 
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Handbook (1976: section 5), together with an illustrative list 
of considerations for private and social costs and benefits for 
a change from bullocks to tractors. (Appendix C) 
(iv) Unit costs or cost~effectiveness 
Unit cost and cost-effectiveness criteria are widely 
applicable and useful. They are used by OXFAM, with rules of 
thumb for different types of project, and an "index of unit 
costs" which is the cost of a project divided by the number of 
people benefiting. They are especially useful with projects for 
health, education, water supply and the provision of other 
.services* 
Any of these procedures can be criticised. Even the simple 
listing of costs and benefits in Appendix C may be too complex 
for many projects. The key to optimising procedures is to realise 
that the cost-effectivenesa ©f the procedures themselves depends 
'largely on low costs in terms of staff time and of demands for 
information, and high benefits in terms of alerting those taking 
decisions to considerations to bear in mind. The danger is that 
".intelligent" criticism of simple procedures will lead to "improve-
•ments" which make the procedures more ponderous, less practical, ' v. 
and eventually useless. 
(3) Life styles, learning and judgement 
The danger remains that the current trend for demands for 
information by bilateral and multilateral donors will develop a 
galloping elephantiasis which will paralyse administrations, reduce 
. aid to the poorest, and perpetuate and increase dependence on 
foreign expertise. The danger is that more and more highly trained 
and experienced people will be sucked or enticed into the 
.prestigious, well-paid, urban-biased business of project ident-
ification, appraisal, monitoring and evaluation. Just at the 
time when rural development, and the much more difficult objective 
of rural development wh.icrt benefits the poorer rural people, has 
became a priority, there may ironically be less and less contact 
be' ^en those responsible for rural projects and policies on the 
one. hand and rural people on the other. 
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This trend can be moderated by the decentralisation and the 
simple procedures advocated above. But there is one more measure 
to be taken: a conscious and determined drive to counteract the 
effects of the urban and elite life styles, experiences and 
perceptions of those, especially donors, concerned with rural 
policies and programmes. The seriousness of the need varies by 
country and region. But the reform proposed is a requirement by 
every multilateral or bilateral donor that its staff should be 
systematically exposed to and encouraged to learn about rural 
life. This could mean that each donor official would be required 
to spend, say, two weeks of every year living in a village (not 
making the easier, more congenial visits of a rural development, 
tourist) and learning how rural people, and especially the poor 
rural people, live. 
The benefits would be many. Some officials would resign. 
Others would work harder and better. The asymmetry of the aid 
relationship would be mitigated, since "donors" would have to go 
cap-in-hand to "recipients" and ask them to allow their "donor" 
staff to be recipients of experience in villages. 
A final benefit would be improved judgement. However carefully 
procedures are devised, training undertaken, and feasibility appraised, 
the intangible element of judgement always has a major part ID play. 
What matters is that judgement should be good. With poverty-focused 
rural development it must be based upon a realistic understanding of 
rural realities. Direct exposure to village life, if sensitively 
managed, should enable officials better to assess rural needs, better 
to appreciate the capabilities of rural people and their potential 
for participation, and better to understand and counteract the 
tendency for projects to be captured by rural elites. Officials 
should become better judges of implementability. They might repeatedly 
learn and relearn the lesson that simple is practical. The outcome 
should, indeed, be that many more projects would be selected and 
implemented which would truly benefit the poorer rural people in ways 
which they would welcome. 
< • 
RJ , 'sn 
2 3,>.11 
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APPENDIX B A POVERTY RANKING METHOD FOR RURAL PROJECTS 
The proposal which follows was thought out in relation to 
procedures in Botswana, The examples given are hypothetical or 
real cases from Botswana. A similar method is being considered 
in Papua New Guinea. 
Most rural projects in Botswana are not subjected to any 
formal cost-benefit analysis but are written up first in a 
thumbnail sketch and later in a project memorandum. The procedure 
is outlined in the Botswana Government's Planning Officers Manual 
(Republic Of Botswana, 1976: chapter 3). At present this procedure 
does not appear to require that those who are expected to benefit 
should be identified. 
In Botswana there is a strong income gradient from extra-
rural (low) through cattle posts, small villages and large villages 
t.o urban centres (high) and a persistent tendency for large village 
bias in benefits from projects in spite of Government policy directed 
towards reducing rural poverty. The proposal therefore includes a 
ranking of zones in which the expected beneficiaries reside. 
The proposal is simple. Each thumbnail sketch and project 
memorandum would be ranked by the originating, ministry to indicate 
which groups of people and in which zones were expected to benefit 
from the project. The ranking would be ordinal, in this case 1'(high 
benefits) through 5 (low benefits). If the benefits were from 
income, the ranking would be based on the total additional permanent 
net direct income accruing to members of the group or residents of 
the zone. If the benefits were from services, the rankings would be 
based on the numbers of people in each group or zone expected to 
benefit from the services. 
The omission of columns for these figures (incomes, numbers of 
beneficiaries) is deliberate. 1% will quite often be very clear 
from local knowledge what the correct ranking is, but more difficult 
to set figures on it. It would be a matter for judgement whether the 
costs of estimating incomes or numbers of beneficiaries would be 
justified by any benefits from doing so. 
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The relevant part of the thumbnail sketch and project 
memorandum would look something like this: 
Which groups will benefit? Where do the beneficiaries live? 
Group Ranking 
Very Poor 
• Poor 
:'• Small Men 
Well Off 
Very Wealthy 
Zone Ranking 
Extra-rural 
Cattle Posts 
Small Villages 
Large Villages 
Urban Centres 
Notes: 
•A preliminary indication of the groups is: 
.Very Poor: People without stock and who do not cultivate 
regularly, including-borehole squatters, hunters 
' and gatherers/ destitutes, cattle herders and 
•
 t
 traditional dependents. 
People with small stock only and/or 4 or less h/c 
and/or who cultivate by borrowing animals for 
draught. 
People v/ith small cattle herds (5-20 h/c) or income 
equivalent small enterprises. 
People with 20-200 h/c or income-equivalent medium 
enterprises. 
People with over 200 h/c or income-equivalent 
larger enterprises. 
The ranking (1 (high), 2, 3, 4, 5 (low)) for group and for zone should 
be entered in the boxes as appropriate. 
Poor: 
Small Men: 
.Well Off: 
Wealthy: 
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P ro j ec t: Veterinary Quarantine Fence 
Which groups will benefit? 
Group Ranking 
Very Poor 4 ~ 
Poor 4 « 
Small Men 3 
Well Off 2 
Wealthy 1 
Where do the beneficiaries live? 
Zone [ Ranking 
Extra Rural 
1™ — — — -
4 * 
Cattle Posts 4 -
Small Villages 3 
Large Villages 1 * 
Urban Centres 1 = 
rtotes: The main direct beneficiaries are large cattle owners 
in large villages and urban centres. Permanent employment in 
maintenance gangs will be created for 2 foremen and 30 labourers, 
mainly from extra rural and cattle posts zones, but benefits to 
them will be small compared with those to the large cattle owners. 
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APPENDIX C Villaqe-Level Cost-Benefit Budget: 
An Example of a Change from Bullocks to Tractors 
Losses Gains 
Revenue Lost 
Custom Work (Bullocks) 
Extra Revenue 
Yields Increase 
Crop Intensity Rises 
Crop Mixture Changes 
Acreage Increases 
Custom Work (Tractor) 
Alternative Use of Bullock 
- Land 
Extra Costs Costs Saved 
.Fixed costs of new 
• machine 
Operating costs of new 
machines 
.'. Hired Labour 
Bullocks' Concentrated Feed 
Hired Labour 
Maintenance' of Bullock 
Equipment 
Loss of Cash Income Gain in Cash Income 
Social Loss 
Polarisation of Income 
Distribution 
Increase in Unemployment 
Polarisation of Village 
Structure 
Dependence on small number 
of power units means higher 
irisk of losing crops if 
, machines break down 
Social Gain 
Increase in Leisure and 
Decrease in Drudgery 
Increase in Prestige of Some 
Individuals 
Source: OXFAM 1976: 5-8 
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